ENG 102: Professor Michael Benton
Living
and Dying in The Valley
I’ve
never met an infantrymen who didn’t crave and desire the ideology of war and killing
everything in sight. Until you’re on your first patrol and all hell breaks
loose, it’s in the moments of those first cracks of bullets heading in your
direction that you see war in a different light. Finding yourself making
mistakes, those choices and mistakes you make determine the fate of not only
those you’re shooting at but the men to your left and right. The very thing
that infantrymen crave and want becomes a brutal reality when a comrade falls
on the battlefield from a loose bullet flying from the unknown.
In
May 2007, the 2nd Battalion 503rd Infantry of the 173rd
Airborne Division deployed the men of Battle Company 2nd platoon for
fifteen months into what’s known throughout history as the graveyard of empires,
the Korengal Valley which would later be named Valley of Death to the men who
lived and served there. American journalist Sebastian Junger and British
photojournalist Tim Hetherington were imbedded with these men. Tim and
Sebastian focus mainly on outpost Restrepo and the twenty men who defended it. The
film brings to life through filming, photography, and interviews, the
hardships, difficulties, and raw realities of war, giving every day civilians
an insight never seen before through the eyes of these men. The film Restrepo was
given its name after one of the first lives lost to an endless war, Private
First Class Juan ‘Doc’ Restrepo, the medic for 2nd platoon.
Like
many young soldiers the men of 2nd platoon had dreams and fantasies
of what war would be like. In the opening scene of the film Restrepo, Private First Class Steve Kim,
Private Juan ‘Doc’ Restrepo, Sergeant Brendan O’Byrne, and Private First Class
Misha Pemble-Belkin on a train one week before deployment traveling to go out
and celebrate one last time before leaving Vicenza, Italy. They laugh jokingly
about going to war, and you can see the innocence in their eyes as they know
nothing of what is to come. That innocence would very soon be gone and would
never return. There’s nothing light about killing another human being and
especially seeing one of your brothers in arms die.
The
primary mission that 2nd platoon was given was to secure the road
that went through the Korengal Valley to the Chawkay Valley so that the locals
could have an easier route into the Pech River Valley. They were transported by
chinooks (helicopters) immediately after landing they were welcomed by mortar
rounds. The Taliban knew this was a new unit and wanted to give them a proper
welcoming and did the same fourteen months later as a goodbye. The Korengal
Outpost would be their home for the next fourteen months. The Korengal Valley
itself is one of the most dangerous places in Afghanistan. One of the hardest
fought over pieces of ground in Afghanistan and only being six miles long and a
half mile wide. When staying at the Korengal Outpost the men got one hot meal a
day served from a green tent and showered once a week from water that was
pumped from a local creek. The latrines (bathrooms) consisted of PVC pipes
stuck into the ground at an angle to dissolve urine called piss tubes. They had
drums that had been cut and used as toilets these were burned once a day using
diesel fuel by the Afghan workers contracted by the government. When staying at
OP Restrepo the men wore the same uniform for the thirty days they were there,
they didn’t get to shower and would sleep with their boots on ready to fight at
all times. By the time they returned back to Outpost Korengal their uniforms
were literally in tatters and would be burnt and they were given a new uniform
(Junger, “Why Veterans Miss War”). Including these details, the film shows us
how incredibly dismal soldiers live in war.
The first patrol 2nd platoon went
on was a joint patrol with the 10th Mountain Division who Battle
Company was replacing. These guys weren’t acclimated the same as the guys from
the 10th mountain Division were. They were carrying no less than eighty
pounds each, climbing up into the mountains, as one of the soldiers starts to
fall behind from the weight of the machine gun he was carrying they come under
fire. Everyone’s trying to take cover where there was no cover. The situation
for the soldiers was chaotic, trying to return fire to the enemy without
knowing their location was useless, but gives the men of 2nd platoon
an eye opening experience of what is to come for the next 14 months (Junger, War
10).
From
the beginning of this film, CPT Kearney meets with the elders of the village
several times to discuss the project to build a drivable road to connect the
valleys together. The elders don’t seem interested in this idea of a road and
feel more like it is being built to help the Americans. When CPT Kearney is
talking with the elders and tells them in order to complete the road and other
projects they have planned for their valley he needs them to help the
government. I couldn’t help but laugh, these people hate Americans being in
their country. Sure you can find a couple here and their who have benefited
from the US being in Afghanistan but they are far and in between. Dealing with and trying to negotiate
with people who haven’t changed their way of living in the last one thousand years
is more difficult than it seems. In another meeting with the elders, the elders
are upset that CPT Kearney and 2nd platoon continue to detain locals
for questioning, they mention one man by name and ask why he hasn’t returned.
When CPT Kearney tells them he saw the video of that man cutting the heads off
of other locals, the locals begin to laugh about it as if it’s just a big joke.
This was included in the film to emphasize the difference in in their mindset
between normal life/normal behavior, the attitudes of the locals, and how their
way of life is influenced by the Taliban. The film is clear about the fact that
when the Americans leave, the Taliban will still control the local populous,
which makes it impossible for them to change. These are the mindsets of these
people and its what 2nd platoon dealt with day in and day out.
One
of the main issues 2nd platoon faces is that they aren’t close
enough to the villages to provide security. This allows the Taliban to put
pressure on the local villagers to help aid them and also recruit the sons of these
local tribes. Because of this reason, and to extend the security range in hopes
to gain ground from the Taliban, CPT Kearney decides to place an additional
outpost further southeast of Korengal out post which becomes OP Restrepo
(Restrepo). OP Restrepo was involved in more than 215 TICs (Troops in Contact)
in the twelve months they were there. Within the first two months of being in
country 2nd platoon lost two soldiers, one of which was PFC Vimoto
who also was the Brigade Sergeant Majors son. The Brigade Sergeant Major is the
highest ranking enlisted soldier out of several thousand men in the Brigade,
and CPT Kearney’s first mission he takes these guys on he gets the BDG SM son
killed (Korengal). This didn’t make it into the film but was in an interview in
extra footage which was shown in the sequel Korengal.
For a son and father to be in the same war and the same campaign together is
rare in itself, but to have your son murdered and it technically be under your
watch is very significant, this was a huge victory for the Taliban. The death
of Vimoto and Restrepo shows how dangerous their area of operations is and how
much 2nd platoon really needed OP Restrepo.
PFC
Jaun ‘Doc’ Restrepo, Restrepo was close to many of the men and it seemed
fitting that they name the outpost after their fallen comrade. How they built
OP Restrepo is a story in itself. twenty men left in the middle of the night
carrying everything they would need to live off of for the next four weeks and
humped (walking under a heavy amount of weight) approximately 1,000 meters over
treacherous terrain to a small ridge. They began digging and filling sandbags
to create a barrier between themselves and the Taliban’s bullets that rained
over them daily. The significance of this location was because the Taliban had
established fortified fighting positions in the vicinity of OP Restrepo’s
location. Without establishing OP Restrepo they wouldn’t be able to effectively
kill the Taliban because of visibility, and the distance from the Taliban’s
fighting positions to the Korengal out post. These twenty men had to have some
sort of fighting position established before daylight, when daylight came it
was like a slap in the face to the Taliban they had successfully established a
well dug in fighting position. Fighting is just what they would do from that
morning until the last day in the valley. Throughout the film you see the 2nd
platoon men celebrating and bragging about firefights and who they have killed.
To many, this is sick and just plain wrong, but a young man in the middle of a
war he doesn’t even understand the dark sense of humor is a matter of survival.
The best way to cope with death in many circumstances is to joke about it and
find a way to laugh it off. In one scene in the chow hall, there’s a small
group of guys joking and one speaks up saying “he was one of the first guys
there to be messed with.” Then, another speaks up saying “yeah but look at that
pretty face I’d fuck you back in the states.” In the infantry and especially
being deployed in a place as rough as OP Restrepo a sense of humor even in the
sickest of ways is sometimes what saves a soldier’s sanity. This is another
example that Junger and Hetherington shows of how these men keep themselves in
check, and police each other.
One
mission that will be remembered forever not only by the men that were involved
in that mission but the history books as well is Operation Rock Avalanche.
Operation Rock Avalanche was supposed to be a six day mission, it would require
them to go where the 10th Mountain Division told them to never go or
they would die. On October 19, 2nd PLT was air assaulted in by chinook
into the enemy’s backyard. Many of them thought it was a suicide mission but
none questioned it. This is a prime example of the pressure that is put on
lower enlisted soldiers especially when in country. To question orders passed
down from higher ranking members of the platoon or company is career suicide.
If you’re not a “yes” man and get your career won’t go far. There were apaches (helicopters)
scanning the ridgeline looking for any enemy movement, there was unmanned
drones flying overhead monitoring all movement on the ground (Rubin. E). CPT
Kearney was out for more than just the mission objective it seems, he was out
for revenge on the soldier’s lives that were taken from the platoon and the men
who had been wounded up to this point. Revenge has a cost that comes with it
though. The mission started off smooth, insurgents were seen coming from
everywhere and were heard talking over two-way radios. The AC-130 Warship began
taking them out, then leveled a compound. At one point though the pilots
refused to follow CPT Kearneys orders to fire because they didn’t see any
hostile intent. CPT Kearney was blood thirsty. In a consensus given to his soldiers early on
in the deployment his men explained they felt that CPT Kearney was playing Russian
roulette with their lives and the other half thought he stuck too closely to
the rules of engagement. Shortly later a B-1 Bomber came in and dropped two
2,000 pound bombs on the village north of them. CPT Kearney said: “O.K., I’ve
done my killing for the week. I’m ready to go home” (Rubin. E). The next
morning the death tally came in five dead and eleven wounded all of them women
and children all of them civilians. Even through a camera lens, the scene is
extremely graphic. There are children literally lying on the ground wounded and
some dead while the very soldiers that cause the harm to them are going through
their homes and questioning them (Restrepo). This part of the film really puts
into perspective the difficult situation that the locals were put in. On one
hand, the civilians have the Americans pressuring them for information and
harassing them. On the other hand there’s the Taliban threatening to kill them
and their families if they help the Americans. They have no choice but to sit
there holding their dead daughters and sons and watch the men who just killed
their family members rummage through their personal belongings.
CPT
Kearney spent the next day speaking with the elders of the village trying to
find some common ground but the elders made their decision. The elders said
they wanted Jihad in their villages. CPT Kearney decided to send out SKT (small
kill teams) twenty four hours passed with no sign of the enemy, but then the
bullets began coming in from multiple direction. 2nd platoon had
multiple wounded, it was chaotic and the men started to fall apart as their
brothers died in front of them. The enemy was literally on top of them they
made eye contact before Specialist Marc Solowski shot him. When the insurgents
retreated CPT Kearney ordered a small team of 2nd platoon soldiers
to go after them, some of the gear was missing and he wanted it back (Rubin. E).
When this happens in the film it seems as if CPT Kearney was starting to lose
his demeanor and control of his emotions. To send a group of men chasing after some
lost gear. After just having a mass casualty event is irrational and dangerous.
Any leader with a rational mind would see that sending more men to possibly be
injured or killed isn’t worth the few pieces of equipment. The men were badly
shaken up and admitting it. They were repeatedly saying, “what just happened,”
to the men who were killed. But, CPT Kearney was furious and ordered air
support to drop a bomb on the house they believed the insurgents went in with
the gear that was missing. They missed the target but some think on purpose.
CPT Kearney was arguing over the radio with HQ (Head Quarters) about bombing
that house. The higher echelon was concerned with civilian casualties. “Kearney
was watching a crow flying above us. ‘Taliban are right,’ he said. ‘Like they
said yesterday, follow the birds, they follow the Americans. I wish I was made
as strong as haj’” their nickname for insurgents. “They were balls to do what
they did. And guess what? I’m not gonna lie. They won” (Rubin. E). Every man
has a breaking point and after months of
being knee deep in the carnage of war, I believe in this moment CPT
Kearney had hit his breaking point. His platoon was combat ineffective because
of the number of casualties they had taken, which weighed heavy on his shoulders
as a leader. This battle is one that will go down in the books as a day America
was beaten badly. That night bombs were dropped all night long. Specialist Sal
Giunta from 1st platoon was up for the Medal of Honor after his
squad was ambushed and from three different sides SPC Giunta was shot several
times while trying to move his buddies out of sight of the enemy. Two Taliban
were carrying an American soldier away when he realized what was happening, he
chased them killing one of them and wounding the other (Profile). Not every
soldier in the Army would take off running in the direction of the firefight
after seeing the squad leader shot in the head and taking multiple shots to the
chest himself. Its something between the lines of stupidity and bravery which
in often times results in a valorous award of some sort.
After
Operation Rock Avalanch 2nd platoon were not combat effective,
simply meaning they didn’t have enough soldiers to effectively go out and fight
them enemy and win. The film shows CPT Kearney getting the men together to give
what appeared to be a motivation speech or a big brother talk to his company.
The speech was terrible and you could see it on the guys faces as the camera
pans across them. They stand and listen because they have to. CPT Kearney tells
them, “don’t go snuggle up in your woobie (poncho liner) and cry, deal with it
and get over it.” So easy for someone to say that wasn’t literally holding his
buddy when he died or feels they may be reason for a friends death. I have
found that a lot of times leaders feel they have to give this tough guy speech
when soldiers are killed and it hardly ever comes out right. Not saying
anything at all or a simple hand on a soldiers shoulder in time of mourning
would suffice.
Between
2005-2010 the Korengal Valley has claimed forty two American lives and resulted in 4 Medals of Honor, one of which
was earned by Staff Sergeant Salvatore A. Giunta of the 173rd on
this deployment during Operation Rock Avalanche, this was the first living
soldier to receive the Medal of Honor since Vietnam (Bohon). The Army only had
soldiers deployed to the Korengal Valley for five years because of high
casualty rates and lack of progress. General Stanley McChrystal made the
decision to officially pull out of the Korengal Valley in 2010 because fighting
from isolated areas and hilltops was not gaining the US any ground against the
Taliban (Rubin. A). One million pounds of ordinance were dropped by air support
in 2007 in Afghanistan (Rubin. E), which is twice as much as the Statue of Liberty
weighs. 90% of those ordinance was dropped in the Korengal Valley (Restrepo). The
men of 2nd platoon returned back to Italy where many of them had
difficulties adjusting back into civilian life, some going AWOL (absence
without leave), and many having behavioral issues showing signs of paranoia.
They were recorded saying “they felt safer in the Korengal where people was
shooting at them every day” (Junger 265-266). Only a few of the men from 2nd
platoon stayed in the Army to continue their careers (Junger 269, 273-276).
Works
Cited
Bohon, Daven.
First Living Medal of Honor Recipient Since Vietnam. September 21, 2010.
https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/1324-first-living-medal-of-honor-recipient-since-vietnam
Junger, Sebastian.
War, Twelve, 2010.
Junger, Sebastian.
“Why Veterans Miss War” Ted Talks.
(23 May 2014). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TGZMSmcuiXM
Korengal (USA: Sebastian
Junger and Gretchen McGowan, 2015)
Profile: SSG
Giunta, A. Salvatore. (ND)
https://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/giunta/profile.html
Restrepo
(USA:
Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington, 2010)
Rubin, Alissa.
“U.S. Forces Close Post in Afghan ‘Valley of Death’.” NY Times. April 14, 2010. Web.
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/world/asia/15outpost.html
Rubin, Elizabeth.
“Battle Company is Out There.” NY Times.
February 24, 2008. Web. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html
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